Policing, Brutality, and the Demands of Justice by Hunt, Luke William
This is an uncorrected draft - cite published version available at Taylor & Francis Online:
Luke William Hunt (2021), "Policing, Brutality, and the Demands of Justice," 
Criminal Justice Ethics, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129X.2021.1893930
Article
Policing, Brutality, and the Demands of
Justice
LUKE WILLIAM HUNT∗
Why does institutional police brutality continue so brazenly? Criminologists and other 
social scientists typically theorize about the causes of such violence, but less attention 
is given to normative questions regarding the demands of justice. Some philosophers 
have taken a teleological approach, arguing that social institutions such as the police 
exist to realize collective ends and goods based upon the idea of collective moral 
responsibility. Others have approached normative questions in policing from a more 
explicit social-contract perspective, suggesting that legitimacy is derived by adhering to 
(limited) authority. This article examines methodologies within political philosophy for 
analyzing police injustice. The methodological inquiry leads to an account of how 
justice constrains the police through both special (or positional) moral requirements 
that officers assume voluntarily, as well as general moral requirements in virtue of a 
polity’s commitment to moral, political and legal values beyond law enforcement and 
crime reduction. The upshot is a conception of a police role that is constrained by 
justice from multiple foundational stances.
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I. IntroductionQ2
¶
George Floyd was killed by a police
officer in Minneapolis, Minnesota,
on 25 May
¶
2020. The officer knelt on
Floyd’s neck for over eight minutes
while Floyd—who was handcuffed
—exclaimed that he could not
breathe. When Floyd became unre-
sponsive, the officer continued to
use his knee to pin Floyd’s neck to
the asphalt street. By any measure,
the killing should be remarkable in
a liberal society such as the United
States. But even at this late stage in
the twenty-first century, police bru-
tality continues with alarming fre-
quency. Indeed, the officer who
killed Floyd acted with calm resolve
in broad daylight, seemingly
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unconcerned that his actions were
being filmed by citizens who
pleaded for him to let Floyd breathe.1
Why does institutional police bru-
tality continue so brazenly? Crimi-
nologists and other social scientists
typically theorize about the causes
of such violence, but less attention is
given to normative questions regard-
ing the demands of justice. The bur-
geoning philosophical interest in
policing suggests a variety of ways
to evaluate these questions. Some
have taken a teleological approach,
arguing that social institutions such
as the police exist to realize collective
ends and goods based upon the idea
of collective moral responsibility.
Others have approached normative
questions in policing from a more
explicit social-contract perspective,
arguing that legitimacy is derived
by adhering to (limited) authority.
After sketching a brief history of
policing and brutality, this paper
begins by examining methodologies
within political philosophy for ana-
lyzing police injustice. The
methodological inquiry leads to the
view that justice constrains the
police through both special (or pos-
itional) moral requirements that offi-
cers assume voluntarily, as well as
general moral requirements that con-
strain the police in virtue of a polity’s
commitment to concepts such as per-
sonhood and human dignity.
Given the proliferation of cases in
the United States that have received
international attention, this paper
focuses on policing in the US rather
than attempting a comprehensive
comparative analysis of policing
around the world. However, there
are moral, political, and jurispruden-
tial resonances among different states
and cultures (such as human dignity
and the rule of law) that connect
various manifestations of policing
philosophically. Moreover, the
methods of political philosophy
examined herein may be applied to
a variety of states with a variety of
institutional commitments. This
paper thus raises questions that vir-
tually all societies must ask.
II. A Brief History of Policing and Brutality
A multitude of factors have contribu-
ted to the police’s violent evolution.
Dramatic changes in society—includ-
ing cultural, industrial, economic,
and technological revolutions—over
the last two centuries cannot be over-
stated. The police’s role in these revo-
lutions varies considerably from
place to place, though it is particu-
larly noteworthy that the police
have roots in practices such as slave
patrols and strikebreaking in the
US.2 Subsequent progressive move-
ments focused upon addressing—
often through the police—a number
of emerging problems stemming
from industrialization, urbanization,
and prohibition, including class and
ethnic conflict, organized crime, and
political corruption.3 In short,
modern policing emerged—with
mixed results—during a time of sig-
nificant change and social friction.
Sir Robert Peel, a British states-
man who served twice as Prime Min-
ister in the middle of the nineteenth
century, is credited with a series of
principles that guided the newly-
formed London Metropolitan Police
in 1829. The establishment of the
Metropolitan Police is often charac-





















democratic policing because the
Peelian principles implied legitimacy,
trust, equality, restraint, and the sanc-
tity of life.4
In the United States, Theodore
Roosevelt has a significant place in
police history. Roosevelt served as
police commissioner in New York
during the so-called progressive era
of reform in the late 1890s. In the
lead-up to Roosevelt’s tenure as com-
missioner, bruised and bloodied
immigrants had testified to the
police’s brutality and corruption.5
Despite a subsequent period of pro-
fessionalization in the United States
and elsewhere, the police continued
to rely heavily upon the tools of coer-
cive force and violence to achieve law
enforcement ends.
Over the ensuring years, a “war”
on crime evolved in conjunction with
decades of semi-reform, racism, socio-
economic disparity, and general cul-
tural upheaval—especially the
turmoil of the 1960s and beyond. Sub-
sequently, a militarized police
“warrior” concept was bolstered by a
longstanding commitment to “law
and order” policies that were “tough
on crime” at the expense of other
values and strategies such as legiti-
macy and public justification.6 Even
with sweeping professionalization
efforts, then, the history of policing is
largely a history of strife.
Consider the police killing of Phi-
lando Castile, who was shot by the
police four years before Floyd’s
death. Castile, a 32-year-old Black
man, was driving his car in a
suburb of Saint Paul, Minnesota,
when an officer pulled him over—
along with his girlfriend and 4-year-
old daughter—for having a brake
light out. Castile is heard saying,
“Sir, I have to tell you, I do have a
firearm on me.” Before Castile
finishes that sentence, the officer has
his hand on his own gun and is
pulling it out of the holster. Before
being shot, Castile had exclaimed,
“I’m not pulling it out.” Castile—an
elementary school lunchroom
worker—had a lawful permit to
carry his handgun, which was sub-
sequently found in his pocket on his
dead body.7
The Minnesota police officer who
shot and killed Castile had attended
a training course called “The Bullet-
proof Warrior.” These courses teach
officers to be less hesitant to use
lethal force, urging them to be
willing to use it more quickly and
teaching them how to adopt the men-
tality of a warrior.8 Of course, the his-
torical development of policing is not
defined by a selection of brutal inci-
dents, but these cases help illuminate
the extent to which policing has
prioritized law enforcement and
coercive power over other political
values and principles. This idea will
be revisited in section IV.
A final point, then, about the
history of policing that is occasionally
overlooked: Policing is more than
coercive law enforcement. When
there is an accident on the interstate,
who is typically the first to respond?
It is very likely the police, who
assist their communities by addres-
sing emergency situations as emer-
gency operators. The police are also
social enforcers, given that they
respond to incidents such as non-
law-enforcement domestic disputes.
Police use their coercive power not
just to investigate crime, but also to
address other human problems that
require the use of force.9
Given the police’s broad role in
society—and their history of brutal
community interactions—there have
been calls to “defund” (or even




















“abolish”) the police.10 The idea is to
reallocate police funds to other social
service organizations that are more
skilled at handling non-law enforce-
ment situations. Such reforms are
not the topic of this paper, though it
is plausible to think that policing
will continue to include many non-
law enforcement roles for the
foreseeable future. This means that
brutality is not only a philosophical
question, but a pressing practical
question. With this backdrop in
mind, the following sections consider
brutality in light of the demands of
justice.
III. Methodology and Ideology
If some law enforcement practices
lead to brutality, how should those
practices be critiqued considering
competing values and principles?
Political philosophers take a variety
of approaches, which often entail bal-
ancing the demands of ideal theories
of justice (theories based upon ideal-
ized assumptions about a society, citi-
zens, and social conditions) and
nonideal theories of justice (theoriz-
ing in a way that deals with the







sitional nonideal theory—is based
upon the position that ideal and non-
ideal theory should work together.11
John Rawls put it this way: “[U]ntil
the ideal is identified
¶
… nonideal
theory lacks an objective, an aim, by
reference to which its queries can be
answered.”12 In other words, noni-
deal policies addressing injustice
seek to transition to the ideal. Even
if the ideal cannot be accomplished,
then, it provides a goal and con-
straints on the path to remedy
injustice.
If one evaluates police injustice
under this approach, policies
seeking to address injustice should
first be politically possible given a
commitment to reasonable plural-
ism that allows for an overlapping
consensus of views within a
diverse society.13 Consider how the
police are required to interact with
a diverse array of persons and
backgrounds—from ethnicity, reli-
gion, and politics, to mental
health, gender, and sexual orien-
tation. It is thus reasonable to
think that communities should be
policed according to laws, policies,
and regulations that can be justified
to each member—despite the diver-
sity of backgrounds. Of course,
police strategies and tactics (and
policies seeking to remedy injustice
generally) must also be effective
under transitional nonideal theory.
In other words, the policies should
actually work.14
The first two tenets of transitional
nonideal theory—political possibility
and efficacy—tend to involve social
and historical examinations of actual
doctrine and practice (such as the
law and policies discussed in section
IV.1). This is an area in which evi-
dence-based research in criminology
and other social sciences is particu-
larly helpful. On the other hand,
suppose that effectively increasing
security in a diverse community
involves the police’s pursuit of
tactics that are brutal or an affront





















theory must then consider moral
questions regarding the extent to
which security, legitimacy, human
dignity, and other values may be
balanced within society.
Accordingly, transitional nonideal
theory requires that policies seeking
to address injustice must be morally
permissible and prioritize grievances
based upon severity.15 To be sure,
there will be disagreement regarding
which policing tactics are morally
permissible in liberal societies. Tran-
sitional nonideal theory prioritizes
grievous (over less grievous) injus-
tices in terms of a lexical ordering of
political principles (to put it in Raw-
lsian terms). If we assume that the
foundational ideal of political
societies is a particular conception
of persons—a conception based
upon, say, one’s equal status, moral
worth, and human dignity—the pri-
ority rule is personhood.16 For
example, stopping property crime is
a morally permissible goal given the
value of security. However, policing
tactics that are an affront to one’s per-
sonhood would be precluded given
that one’s equal status, moral worth,
and dignity are prioritized over redu-
cing automobile theft.
One might object that policing
and ideal theory do not fit together
because transitioning to the ideal
might entail eliminating the police—
say, if one assumes that the police
would not be needed in an ideal
society without law-breaking.17
Ideal theory of course entails ideal-
ized assumptions about society, but
it is inevitable that some people will
act unjustly even in an operative
ideally just society (given, say, funda-
mental truths about societies and
human psychology). It is thus unsur-
prising that ideal theory might have
something to say about emergencies
of security requiring law
enforcement.18
2. Policing and Social Contractarian
Ideals
Transitional nonideal theory is often
steeped in social contract theory:
certain tasks (such as policing) are
entrusted to agents of the collective
in order to permit a mutually ben-
eficial (andmorally justified) division
of labor. This is said to result in a
right to be secured legitimately and
within the limits of the state’s
authority.19
Although theories of legitimacy
abound, consider the way that trans-
actional theories (such as those
based upon reciprocation and fair-
ness) are related to the limits of poli-
cing. The basic idea is that—as
reciprocators within a collective—
we are all presumed to have a fair
share of the collective labor. This
also means that persons are viewed
as having a general duty to the collec-
tive because it would be wrong to
reap the benefits as a “free rider”
who takes advantages of others’
good-faith compliance.20 This is a
relatively standard position in politi-
cal philosophy, with Jonathan Jacobs
writing that “it is reasonable to
think that any plausible conceptions
[of a well-ordered or healthy civil
society] require people to…
cooperate in a variety of settings…
[and] be capable of decently effective
practical reasoning with respect to
their own interests and with respect
to the interests of family members,
associates, organizations, and
groups.”21 What are the normative
contours of the state’s response to
breakdowns in civil society?
Policing is raised when people
choose not to reciprocate, as when




















one interferes with another’s liberty
or the community’s security. A pro-
minent ideal within liberal polities
is that failed reciprocation is dealt
with in accordance with the rule of
law and respect for one’s personhood
and human dignity.22 This contrasts
with dealing with law-breakers
through unjustified or arbitrary
police punishment and discretion, as





Of course, there are many fruitful
ways to approach problems in poli-
cing from within the context of politi-
cal philosophy. For example, one
might seek progress in policing by
emphasizing (actual, historic) insti-
tutional values rather than unrea-
lized ideals. My sense is that
political theorizing about liberal
ideals and historic values regarding
actual, liberal institutions (such as
the police) are deeply connected.
Consider, say, Ronald Dworkin’s pos-
ition that theorizing should focus not
only on history, but also on the best
understanding and interpretation of
legal and political principles—
meaning that the truth value of legal
and political propositions is based
upon both descriptive statements
about what the propositions are and
evaluative statements about what
they should be.24
Alternatively, consider Jacobs’s
account of the relationship between
civics (“fundamental values and prin-
ciples concerning the political/legal
order”) and policy (“actual practices
and administrative procedures”):
Any concrete steps regarding policy
“will involve assumptions and have
implications regarding fundamental
issues of civics.”25 By analogy, it
seems plausible that aspirational
ideals will draw from the fundamen-
tal values and principles of civics, as I
have noted elsewhere: “transitional
nonideal theory addresses practical
questions… in part through the
lens of theory that is informed by his-
torical ideals… it acknowledges that
the practicality of ideal political
theory is a function of the theory’s
viability in the context of actual, his-
toric conditions.”26 The point is that
we can often find common ground
among seemingly disparate
approaches.
Other philosophers of policing—
such as Seumas Miller—have
pursued teleological arguments with
respect to social institutions generally
and the police institution specifically.
This means that the police are evalu-
ated based upon the extent to which
they realize collective ends and
produce collective goods given collec-
tive moral responsibility.27 More
recently, John Kleinig has focused
upon the philosophical importance of
ends and means in policing. In other
words, perhaps our focus should be
on the relationship between core
social ends (such as security and
crime reduction) and the concrete
means through which those ends are
achieved by the police—such as
force, deception, and discretion.28
Each of these approaches (among
others) is different in important
ways, and it is beyond the scope of
this paper to explore the differences
in detail. The commonality is com-
peting moral demands within politi-
cal society. For this reason I
continue to return to transitional
nonideal theory, which incorporates
the practical considerations of politi-
cal possibility and efficacy in a way
that is constrained bymoral consider-





















ideal theory of justice. But
one problem that must be
addressed is whether an ideal
theory of justice has been sufficiently
worked out to guide our nonideal
theorizing.29
IV. Political, Legal, and Moral Obligations in Policing
Transitional nonideal theory needs a
target for which to aim. Although
one need not embrace a Rawlsian
ideal theory of justice—or any other
particular theory—one does have to
make some basic assumptions about
what an ideal theory of justice
would entail. As alluded to in
section III.1, I take the plausible
view that a conception of persons
will be at the core of any ideal
theory of justice.
Such conceptions traditionally
have been based upon the value of
natural human properties such as
rationality and voluntariness (as
with Kant and Locke), which give
rise to conceptions of freedom, equal-
ity, and dignity. Rawls put it this way:
“[I]n virtue of their two moral
powers (a capacity for a sense of
justice and for a conception of the
good) and the powers of reason (of
judgment, thought, and inference
connected with these powers)
persons are free. Their having these
powers to the requisite minimum
degree to be fully cooperating
members of society makes persons
equal.”30 These and similar con-
ceptions of persons give rise to both
special and general moral obli-
gations, which help guide nonideal
theorizing and the demands of
justice.
1. Positional Obligations in
Policing: Law and Policy
Special and positional requirements
are grounded in (or arise within)
those relationships that we have (or
freely make) with persons or
groups.31 If a police officer fails to
do his duty as police officer, then he
is morally blameworthy because he
voluntarily entered his position and
undertook the duties of that position.
Unlike most people, then, one of the
explicit special obligations of the
police is to obey the law.
Given recent attention to policing
in the United States, consider how
the police are constrained by legal
obligations derived from the Consti-
tution. The Fourth Amendment to
the US Constitution protects the
“right of the people to be secure in
their persons… against unreason-
able… seizures.” A police officer’s
use of force (deadly, or otherwise)
constitutes a seizure and must be
reasonable. Courts have construed
the “reasonableness” of force based
upon “the perspective of a reasonable
officer on the scene, rather than with
the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”32
This allows for broad deadly-
force polices, meaning that much of
the police’s day-to-day conduct is
more directly governed by regu-
lations and internal policy.33 For
example, here is the policy I learned
while training to be a Special Agent
at the FBI Academy at Quantico:
“Special agents may use deadly
force only when necessary—when
the agent has a reasonable belief
that the subject of such force poses
an imminent danger of death or
serious physical injury to the agent
or another person.”34 The language




















tracks the expansive “reasonable-
ness” of the Constitution and case
law, but this minimum requirement
could be enhanced at the policy
level.35
By any standard, the officer who
killed George Floyd breached his
special positional obligation to
follow law and policy. There was no
threat of harm (Floyd was laying
flat on the ground, handcuffed), and
his actions (kneeling on Floyd’s neck
for over eight minutes) were clearly
unreasonable and unnecessary. This
raises the important point that the
police’s positional obligations go
beyond legal obligations.
Consider the case of Eric Garner,
who the police arrested for the
charge of selling loose cigarettes
illegally (without tax). When Garner
pulled away from being handcuffed,
it was reported that “[t]he officer
immediately threw his arm around
[Garner’s] neck and pulled him to
the ground, holding him in what
appears, in a video, to be a choke-
hold. The man can be heard saying
‘I can’t breathe’ over and over again
as other officers swarm about.”36 A
grand jury decided not to indict the
officer who killed Garner because
there was no law prohibiting the offi-
cer’s use of a chokehold. But that
does not address the (policy and
moral) problem regarding the
police’s use of discretion to arrest
Garner for a minor offense that
immediately escalated to the use of
an unauthorized (against policy),
lethal chokehold.
Ironically, even if such tactics are
not against the law—only policy—
they raise questions about a person’s
most basic, human rights. One pro-
minent view discussed in the next
section is that human rights are
grounded in natural rights and
human dignity.37 This raises the
issue of general moral obligations in
policing.
2. Human Dignity and General
Obligations in Policing
In addition to positional obligations,
justice may constrain the police
through a polity’s commitment to
general (non-voluntary) moral
requirements that bind the police in
virtue of another’s personhood and
moral equality, irrespective of
special roles or relationships.38
There are a variety of theories about
what grounds general moral require-
ments, including human dignity (a
person’s priceless worth, or high-
ranking, equal, social status) and
natural rights (rights that would
exist in a pre-institutional state of
nature).39 Such general moral
requirements might bolster a com-
mitment to human rights, which
could be grounded in those natural
or political rights that enable
persons to live with dignity.40
Although various conceptions of
dignity may have overlapping fea-
tures, there are several distinct ways
to think about dignity. Doris Schroe-
der has identified at least five,
which include Kantian Dignity (“a
property of all rational beings,
which gives the possessor the right
never to be treated simply as a
means, but always at the same time
as an end”), Aristocratic Dignity
(“ Q3
¶
the outwardly displayed quality of
a human being who acts in accord-
ance with her superior rank and pos-
ition), and Comportment Dignity (“the
outwardly displayed quality of a
human being who acts in accordance
with society’s expectations of well-





















These conceptions often overlap,
which is apparent in the policing
domain. Although the police may be
justified in treating a person in a par-
ticular way based upon the person’s
comportment (say, resisting arrest),
it must be done in a manner that
does not denigrate the rights com-
prised by the person’s high-ranking,
equal, social, and legal status. In a
similar way, the police’s use of infor-
mants is perhaps an indispensable
investigative tool, but there are
moral limits to the police’s power to
use persons (informants) as a means
to a law enforcement end given a
person’s status and value emanating
from dignity.42
How is human dignity related to
human rights, and how are human
rights related to policing? There is
of course much disagreement about
the nature and foundation of human
rights, but here are three possibilities
regarding their nature and foun-
dation: They are either (1) derived
from human dignity, (2) derived
from natural rights, or (3) derived
from the practical political con-
ceptions and concerns of inter-
national politics.
Some political and legal philoso-
phers think of dignity as a status
concept resulting in a particular
package of (human) rights that a
person has in virtue of being
human.43 Other accounts of human
rights draw from the natural rights
tradition—such as the Kantian and
Lockean traditions—arguing that
pre-institutional natural rights count
as “equal and inalienable” rights of
all human persons.44 Such accounts
are especially relevant within the
context of policing, given that the
Lockean tradition (for instance) is
based upon a natural right to be free
from the non-consensual coercion of
political institutions. The upshot
would be a natural right to legitimate
institutions, requiring us to mitigate
the illegitimacy of institutions such
as the police.
Although these and other ques-
tions about human rights remain
unsettled, I want to now consider
how the basic tenets of any theory
of human rights and human dignity
might be applied in the context of
policing.45
First, human rights may be con-
strued as claim rights in this poli-
cing context because they impose
duties of treatment on the police.
For example, if security of person
is a human right, then it is a
claim right on other people—in
this case, the police—to respect
one’s liberty. I thus have a claim
right against the police not to use
force against me or seize me. On
the other hand, the police have
the power to alter my right and
seize me (with legitimate force) if
I break the law, though I am
immune from brutality given that
the police have no legitimate
power to alter my security of
person through brutal force.46
Human rights are thus political
rights in the policing context
because the police (as duty-bearers)
have power over right-holders.
One’s human right to security of
person may be violated in a multi-
tude of (non-political) ways, but
such a right is uniquely violated
when the police harass, assault, and
brutalize persons under “color of
law” (acting under the pretense of
state authority).47 It thus seems
plausible to think that any justified
conception of the police role includes
pursuing justice in a way that
respects one’s human right to security
of person.




















Given the assumptions discussed
above, it stands to reason that we
would treat—in addition to security
of person—governance by legitimate
authority as a human right that is rel-
evant in the domain of policing. It
would be impractical to wade
further into the voluminous literature
on legitimacy, and I will simply
assume that legitimacy is fundamen-
tally about appropriate authority to
wield power over a person.48 This
approach shows the deep connec-
tions between police legitimacy and
broader notions of state legitimacy.
For instance, a police officer
detaining a person during a “stop
and frisk” acts as an agent of the
state. Accordingly, when the police
act without requisite authority (an
unconstitutional “stop and frisk”),
their acts are illegitimate because
they are not acts of the state; they
are outside the rule of law and
without authority.
The upshot is a natural overlap
between certain human rights and
certain political and civil rights—as
when the police have a general moral
requirement not to brutalize persons,
which is also prohibited by their
special, positional duties as police.49
V. Reforms and Conclusions
It should go without saying that
reforming the police is a difficult
problem that requires a holistic, multi-
faceted approach. The difficulties are
exacerbated by the fact that police
agencies and officers vary widely,
from uniformed patrol officers to
“plainclothes” detectives and other
investigators who pursue investi-
gations spanning many years. The
complexities of politics and jurisdiction
raise different problems for “local”
police who have jurisdiction over
town and county matters, “state”
police who have jurisdiction over
state matters, and federal law enforce-
ment officers who have jurisdiction
over matters that have a national or
international nexus, and so on.
Despite the wide range of officers
and agencies, it is possible to identify
overlapping tenets that constrain law
enforcement given the demands of
justice. Although I cannot address
all the relevant considerations in a
single article, I close by sketching
three domains in which policing
might be reoriented to a broader
ideal of justice: law, police culture,
and politics.50
1. Legal Reform
Holding police accountable for mis-
conduct has long been a problem
given the law of qualified immunity:
a judicially created doctrine shielding
the police (and other government
officials) from being held personally
liable for money damages due to con-
stitutional violations (such as brutal-
ity), assuming the police did not
violate “clearly established” law.51
Legal scholars have argued that
the best way to reform qualified
immunity is legislatively because
the doctrine is primarily based upon
statutory (not constitutional)
interpretation.52 On the other hand,
qualified immunity does not affect
police misconduct that does not rise
to a constitutional violation,
meaning that reform of state tort
law (regarding, say, statutory privi-
leges and indemnification regu-






















Policing is a unique profession in part
because it includes the use of vio-
lence and force. A sense of pro-
fessional exclusivity has resulted in
unique cultural problems such as
the prevailing police warrior iden-
tity.54 Such cultural issues are
complex and difficult to address,
but consider the potential reform of
one cultural problem: the “blue wall
of silence.” This is the informal code
among some police officers not to
report on a colleague’s misconduct
(such as an act of brutality), but to
instead plead ignorance of another
officer’s wrongdoing. The code is
steeped in a confused sense of
police honor that erodes trust and
legitimacy within communities.
Cultural reform tends to focus
on accountability through chains of
command. Troubled police depart-
ments have adopted programs—
such as the “EPIC” program
(Ethical Policing is Courageous)—
focusing upon the idea of active
bystandership. These programs
help foster an expectation (begin-
ning with a department’s leader-
ship) that officers intervene when a
colleague assaults a citizen, lies, or
engages in other misconduct. Offi-
cers are trained to take concrete
steps to address such misbehavior
when it occurs, ultimately generat-
ing an atmosphere that discourages
bad acts from occurring the first
place.55 Such reform efforts tackle
entrenched norms and codes, neces-
sitating a fundamental shift in how
officers view their role.56
3. Political Reform
Politics—local and national—is
perhaps the most difficult obstacle
for police reform. Some commenta-
tors have linked the police’s extensive
collective-bargaining rights to
watered-down legislative reform,
not to mention increases in violent
police misconduct. To be sure,
police unions have secured many
contractual protections regarding
officer exposure to disciplinary
action (including policies erasing dis-
ciplinary records), making it difficult
to hold officers accountable. Reform
is difficult given the influence that
unions hold over politicians, but one
inclusive, community-based idea is
to involve members of the public in
police contract negotiations.57
There are also political impedi-
ments to police reform that are even
more systemic. Some commentators
view the problems in policing as
being connected to broader political,
social, and economic forces. For
example, consider the number of fire-
arms in the United States, which is of
course a broad political issue outside
of policing. Likewise, the police are
often tasked with focusing their law
enforcement role on impoverished
communities that have experienced
generations of systematic oppres-
sion.58 The police cannot change the
economic and political policies that
create and sustain stratification in
states such as the U.S., nor can they
unilaterally shift their attention to
the crimes that prop up that stratifi-
cation (such as white-collar crime
and government fraud and
corruption).
This is related to the important
point that the police are often asked
to enforce politically unpopular
laws (such as drug laws), which can
put the police in a difficult position
with the public. Police discretion is
an important and necessary com-
ponent of the police role (imagine if




















the police had to enforce all speeding
violations), but the answer to unpop-
ular laws is not necessarily an expan-
sion of police discretion (such as the
discretion to not enforce unpopular
laws). There is good law and there
is bad law, but Joseph Raz’s point
about the rule of law and the limits
of discretion seems apt here: “The
discretion of the crime-preventing
agencies should not be allowed to
pervert the law.”59 Accordingly, a
more realistic (politically possible)
and procedurally just approach
might be for the police to begin by
taking remedial action to reduce the
extent to which they unfairly and
unjustly impose unpopular laws on
the community.60
For example, the police might
(1) prioritize the most grievous
injustices—such as violent crime
and affronts to one’s security of
person generally—over, say, posses-
sion of drugs; and (2) enforce all
laws (drug laws or otherwise) in
accordance with the rule of law
and in a way that respects one’s
equal social status and moral
worth (rather than targeting or
exempting some groups based
upon class and ethnicity).61
Related constraints would include
respecting the human dignity of
all persons (including informants
and criminal suspects), and redu-
cing unnecessary operations that
pervert the law (
¶
e.g. unnecessary
drug buys that require sanctioned
law-breaking by the police). In
short, it is plausible to think that
the first order of business is for
the police to take remedial action
reducing the way they unfairly
and unjustly enforce unpopular
laws. Of course, this will ultimately
result in less—or different—enforce-
ment, though for reasons that are in
keeping with a principled transition
toward a holistic ideal of justice.
4. Justice in Policing
Given the general and special obli-
gations that have been discussed,
there is good reason for the police to
pursue their role in ways that goes
beyond a utilitarian focus on security
and crime reduction. Specifically,
these obligations compel the police
to respect human dignity and seek
public justification for their power
in order to enhance legitimacy. One
practical way to do this is a
renewed emphasis on established
policing strategies—such as
community and procedural justice
policing—that seek community
support and buy-in through public
reason.62
Whatever approach is taken with
respect to reform, I hope it is clear
that the problem of police brutality
is more complicated than it might
first appear. Courts have given the
police much leeway with respect to
the use of (deadly) force given that
police must make “split-second”
decisions about the use of such
force.63 This does not mean that
reform is impossible, though it does
mean that we must turn our attention
to the minutes, hours, weeks, and
months leading up to deadly force
encounters. Better recruitment, train-
ing, and operational tactics—priori-
tizing de-escalation, human dignity,
the sanctity of life, and other prin-
ciples of justice—can help the police
avoid encounters that lead to
brutality and deadly split-second
decisions.
Despite the complexities, then, I
will try to put my conclusion
straightforwardly: The police have





















obligations that have multiple foun-
dations—moral, political, and legal.
The sort of conduct that led to
George Floyd’s death thus raises
questions on a number of fronts,
requiring a multifaceted approach
that aims for a holistic conception of
justice.
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